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Abstract
We find that investor sentiment should affect a firm’s employment policy in a world with
moral hazard and noise traders. Consistent with the model’s predictions, we show that higher
sentiment among US investors leads to: (1) higher employment growth worldwide; (2) lower
labor productivity, as the growth in employment is not matched by real value added growth;
and (3) positive wage growth in countries with a greater proportion of high-skill labor, but
negative wage growth otherwise. We also find evidence that sentiment induces greater labor
instability during financial crises, which sheds new light on the view that financial development
has a “dark side”. Overall, the results suggest that sentiment has real effects, especially in
countries that attract more foreign direct investments from the US and that are perceived as
more popular among US investors.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that financial development is positively correlated with a country’s economic growth
(King and Levine, 1993; Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000a, 2000b; Demirg-Kunt and Levine, 2001).
Especially for the industries that are most dependent on external finance, the services the financial
sector provides are an essential catalyst of value added growth (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) and
employment growth (Pagano and Pica, 2012). An important question that remains unanswered,
however, is whether investor sentiment plays a role in this picture. In fact, recent research shows
that sentiment affects firms’ investments (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Chirinko and Schaller,
2001; Baker, Stein and Wurgler, 2003; Polk and Sapienza, 2009), capital structure (Baker and Wur-
gler, 2000) and stock prices (Baker and Wurgler, 2006, 2007), but it is not clear whether it also has
an impact on employment. In this paper, we try to shed some light on this issue both theoretically
and empirically.
To this purpose, we analyze the stock issue of a firm in a world with asymmetric information
and two categories of investors, arbitrageurs and noise traders. We find that when the firm seeks
equity financing, investor sentiment should affect a firm’s employment policy. Consistent with the
model’s predictions, we show that higher investor sentiment in the US leads to: (1) higher employ-
ment growth worldwide; (2) lower labor productivity, as the growth in employment is not matched
by real value added growth; and (3) positive wage growth in countries with a greater proportion of
high-skill labor, but negative wage growth otherwise. We also find evidence that sentiment induces
greater labor instability during financial crises, which sheds new light to the view that financial
development has a “dark side”. All the results are both statistically and economically significant.
The main intuition behind the mechanism is as follows. Following high investor sentiment
among US investors, US firms issue more equity and increase their investments. Since part of these
operations takes place outside the national boundaries, foreign countries also experience higher in-
vestments from the US and thereby higher employment growth. Note, however, that this additional
hiring is inefficient as it is generated by sentiment-driven capital, rather than an improvement in
the economic outlook or production technology. The main innovation of this paper therefore lies in
the fact that this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study that looks into the causal effects
of investor sentiment on employment. In fact, previous literature finds correlation between these
two measures but does not establish causality (McLean and Zhao, 2014).
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We consider the economy from Pagano and Pica (2012), where a manager/entrepreneur needs
to fund a project, but with two important differences: (1) the project is risky, with a binary out-
come (repay or default); (2) we replace the banking sector with a stock market. The manager then
launches an IPO and caters to a population of two categories of investors, arbitrageurs and noise
traders. The difference between these two groups is that the arbitrageurs know the exact probability
of default of the project, which allows them to correctly estimate the expected final cash flow from
the stock. Noise traders instead are affected by sentiment and estimate the probability of default
with a bias, which can be either positive or negative.
Neither arbitrageurs nor noise traders however can verify the firm’s cash flow, which creates
a moral hazard issue. In particular, the manager can extract private benefits by appropriating a
proportion of the firm’s cash flow. This proportion is in turn a decreasing function of the level
of development of the financial system (Pagano and Pica, 2012), which encompasses features such
as monitoring ability and legal protection of investors. Upon receiving the funding the manager
hires new employees, starts production, extracts private benefits, pays the employees1 and leaves
the remainder to the shareholders.
Investors face transaction costs as in Hong and Sraer (2013). Therefore, optimal demand for
the stock is an inverse function of the severity of transaction costs and a direct function of the
difference between the subjective valuation of the firm’s final cash flow and the current stock price.
This implies that the equilibrium price of the stock is a weighted average of all individual valuations,
where the weights are the relative sizes of the arbitrageur and noise trader populations. The effect
of sentiment on the stock price then depends on the size of the noise trader cohort as well as the
size of noise traders’ bias in their estimate of their final cash flow.
Note that in this framework the labor market equilibrium also depends on investor sentiment.
In fact, optimal labor demand is a function of the firm’s technology, the project’s probability of
default and the amount of funding the firm is able to raise on the stock market. Then, when noise
traders are affected by positive sentiment, the firm hires more workers than it should and ends up
with an inefficient level of employment. We call this phenomenon sentiment-driven over-hiring.
Next, we extend the analysis to a framework with two types of industry and n countries. Within
each country, industries can hire either high-skill or low-skill workers and therefore have either high
or low productivity respectively. We assume workers face high switching costs to move across the
1As insiders, employees can observe cash flows.
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two industries (such as e.g. training), so the two labor markets are essentially separate with two
different market clearing wages. In particular, the high productivity industry pays a wage premium,
due to the higher cost of entry.
On the other hand, countries with higher financial development pay higher wages. Therefore,
the optimal hiring strategy for a high-productivity firm is to seek high-skill labor in countries that
feature: (1) lower financial development; and (2) higher elasticity of labor supply in the high-
productivity industry, i.e. a greater net supply of high-skill labor. A symmetrical argument applies
to low-productivity firms.
Note that sentiment driven over-hiring can have an amplified effect in this setting. In the pres-
ence of positive investor sentiment in the local stock market, the firm finds it optimal to increase its
investments and hire new labor. But as long as the firm carries out part of its operations abroad,
its decisions have an impact on employment and wages in foreign countries too. Therefore, local
sentiment can have a global impact.
In order to test the main predictions from the model, we study the effects of US investor sen-
timent on labor markets worldwide. There are three main reasons why we choose the US as our
reference country: (1) it represents the largest and one of most financially developed economies, (2)
its firms typically carry out a nontrivial part of their operations abroad; (3) it is essentially the only
country for which a widely accepted measure of investor sentiment is available (Baker and Wurgler,
2006, 2007; Baker, Wurgler and Yuan, 2012).
To analyze the labor market, we consider a large panel of non-US countries from the Unido
Indstat-3 2006 database2, which spans the period 1970-2003. The dataset provides annual country-
sector statistics on the growth in employment, real wages and real value added. We only consider
countries for which at least 10 observations are available, for a total of 113 countries and 28 indus-
tries.
We define investor sentiment as Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) index, which captures changes in
asset demand not explained by fundamentals. This measure is based on a number of sentiment prox-
ies suggested in previous works, including: the closed-end fund discount; the NYSE share turnover;
the number and average first-day returns on IPOs; the equity share in new issues; and the dividend
premium. Baker and Wurgler carefully purge their index from economic fundamentals and convinc-
2United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Industrial Statistics. Following Pagano and Pica (2012)
we consider the 2006 release, as the following ones have more missing observations.
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ingly show that it has cross-sectional effects: when beginning-of-period proxies for sentiment are
low, subsequent returns are relatively high for stocks that are harder to arbitrages and/or evaluate.
This measure also grants us an important advantage in our setting: it is unlikely to suffer from
reverse causality issues.
Our empirical methodology follows Rajan and Zingales (1998), but also includes a time dimen-
sion as in Pagano and Pica (2012). Therefore, our battery of controls includes a country’s level of
financial development; an industry’s need for external finance; the lagged share of real value added,
employment and real wages of any given country-industry; country-year and sector fixed effects.
Standard errors are robust and clustered by country.
Consistent with the model predictions, we find that a one standard deviation increase in US
investor sentiment in a given year is followed by a 3.29% increase in employment growth worldwide
(t-stat 3.93). The effect is more pronounced for developing countries (4.05%, t-stat 2.79) than for
developed countries (2.69%, t-stat 4.94). This is consistent with the model’s prediction that follow-
ing high sentiment, countries with higher financial development have an incentive to hire workers
in countries with lower financial development. However, this increase in employment coincides with
a general decrease in labor productivity (-2.46%, t-stat -2.69), which is especially strong for OECD
countries (-2.96%, t-stat -6.47).
Rajan and Zingales (1998) point out that since financial markets and institutions help firms
overcome asymmetric information issues, financial development should help industries relying on
external finance grow disproportionately faster. Consistent with this conjecture, they find that real
value added growth of externally dependent industries is significantly higher in financially developed
countries. Pagano and Pica (2012) find a similar effect on employment growth.
In our analysis we manage to replicate both results. The annual rate of growth of value added
and employment are respectively 5.17% (t-stat 2.57) and 3.26% (t-stat 2.11) higher in industries
with greater need for external finance located in countries with higher financial development. How-
ever, we also find that the employment effect is much stronger if we condition the analysis on the
previous year’s level of US investor sentiment. In particular, it increases by a further 2.23% (t-stat
2.18), i.e. it is almost 70% larger. In order to test the effect of sentiment on wages we identify
two subsamples that should be characterized by a large proportion of high-skill labor: the so-called
“Nordic” countries, i.e. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, which represent some
of the leading countries in the world in terms of research and development expenditure, both in
5
absolute and relative terms, as well as education expenditure; and the leading financial economies,
defined as the set of countries characterized by the top 5% ratio of stock market capitalization over
GDP. We find that a one standard deviation increase in investor sentiment is followed by an increase
in real wages growth by 1.07% in Nordic countries (t-stat 2.87) and 13.07% in the most financially
developed economies (t-stat 17.27), while the effect is negative otherwise. This is consistent with
the model’s cross-sectional predictions.
An important question to answer is how exactly US investor sentiment affects employment
abroad. There are two potential channels: US foreign direct investments and US portfolio invest-
ments. Since US foreign direct investments allow investors to exercise a certain degree of influence
and control (at least 10%) over the company, we expect them to constitute the primary channel for
sentiment.
We test this hypothesis using data on US foreign direct investments from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis and on US portfolio investments from the International Monetary Fund’s Coordinated
Portfolio Investment Survey. In particular, we consider two series of foreign direct investments: a
general one, defined as the direct investment position abroad on a historical-cost basis (US FDI);
and a labor-specific one, defined as the direct investment in employment at majority-owned nonbank
foreign affiliates (US FDIL). Consistent with our conjecture, we find that conditioning sentiment
on the level of US FDI and/or US FDIL, the results still hold and even get statistically stronger.
On the contrary, the results do not hold for portfolio investments.
Hwang (2011) proposes an index of foreign country’s popularity among Americans and shows
that it is correlated with US firms’ investments in that country. Since country popularity might
matter in our setting too, we check whether the effect of sentiment-driven US FDI is stronger in
more popular countries. Therefore, we rate a country’s popularity along the following three di-
mensions from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998): a country’s institutional
framework, quality of institutions, and democratic score. The intuition is that US investors should
hold a given foreign country in higher regard if it appears to promote values that are popular in
the US, such as honesty and democracy, as well as feature a similar institutional framework.
Consistent with the conjecture, we find that the coefficient of the interaction term between US
investor sentiment and US FDI is positive and highly significant for the subset of countries with
British legal origin, above-median quality of institutions, and above-median democratic score, but
not significant otherwise. We find similar results replacing US FDI with its labor-specific counter-
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part, US FDIL.
Interestingly, the same industries that benefit the most from financial development are also those
that are hit the hardest during economic downturns (Braun and Larrain, 2005) and financial crises
(Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel, 2007). The effect has been called the “dark side” of financial de-
velopment and seems to exist not only for real value added growth, but also for employment growth
and real wages growth (Pagano and Pica, 2012). In light of this, we look into whether investor
sentiment somehow exacerbates this aspect. To this purpose, we consider the list of banking crises
from Laeven and Valencia (2010). Conditioning on the previous year’s level of US FDI and investor
sentiment, we find that a financial crisis prompts a highly significant drop in employment growth,
real value added growth, labor productivity, and real wages growth. When controlling for sentiment
and US FDI, neither a country’s financial development nor an industry’s external dependence seem
to have an impact on the severity of a crisis.
We also test whether the detrimental effect of crises on employment growth is more pronounced
for countries that are more popular among US investors. Consistent with the conjecture, condi-
tioning on the previous year’s level of US FDI and investor sentiment we find that a financial crisis
negatively affects employment growth in countries with British legal origin, above-median quality of
institutions, and above-median democracy score, whereas the effects are not significant otherwise.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature we
refer to. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 shows the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature review
We refer to two main strands of research. The first one is the vast empirical literature that tries to
shed light on the causal link between finance and growth. Many studies have tackled this question
using country-level data. King and Levine (1993a, 1993b) analyze the impact of lagged financial
development on a country’s rate of economic growth, where the former is defined as the size of
the financial sector at the beginning of the sample period. Demirg-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996)
find that the proportion of firms whose rate of growth exceeds the one prompted by self-financing
is positively related to stock market turnover and to a measure of law enforcement. Levine and
Zervos (1998) find that measures of market liquidity are positively correlated with growth, capital
accumulation and productivity, whereas more traditional measures of development such as stock
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market capitalization are not as robustly related. Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000a) use legal origin
as an instrument for financial development and find that the size of the financial sector is positively
and robustly related to the rate of growth of per capita GDP and total factor productivity.
Other papers have addressed the causality issue using natural experiments, such as changes in
financial market regulation. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) find that the liberalization of the bank-
ing sector in different states in the US has had a positive influence on the state’s growth. Dehejia
and Lleras-Muney (2007) analyze changes in state-level banking regulation between 1900 and 1940
and document similar and robust results. This methodology however could be harder to apply to
different countries or different questions.
Another line of research has used industry-level data to establish causality. In their seminal
paper, Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that industries typically dependent on external finance for
growth develop disproportionately faster in countries with high financial development. The intu-
ition comes from the fact that financial markets and institutions help firms overcome asymmetric
information problems, thus lowering the cost of capital. This test has two main advantages. First,
it looks into a specific mechanism by which finance affects growth, which is a necessary ingredient in
the analysis of causality. Second, it introduces the possibility to correct for country (and industry)
fixed effects.
Interestingly, the same industries that benefit the most from financial development also seem to
be the ones that are hit the hardest during economic downturns. Braun and Larrain (2005) analyze
the production growth rates for 28 manufacturing industries in 111 countries between 1963 and
1999 from the Unido Indstat-3 2001 database, and show that industries that are more dependent
on external finance fare worse during recessions. In particular, more dependent industries are more
strongly affected in recessions when located in countries with poor financial contractibility, and
when their assets are softer or less protective of financiers.
Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel (2007) specifically focus on the impact of banking crises on
growth. Using data from the United Nations Statistics Division’s Industrial Statistical yearbook
on 36 sectors from 38 countries, and 45 banking crises from Caprio and Klingebiel (2002), they
find that industries that are highly dependent on external finance tend to experience a significantly
larger contraction in value added during a banking crisis in countries with greater financial develop-
ment. The impact is larger for industries dominated by young firms that are highly dependent on
external finance and for industries with high levels of intangible assets. The authors suggest that
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their findings unveil a “dark side” of financial development.
Pagano and Pica (2012) use the same methodology as in Rajan and Zingales (1998) to extend
their analysis to labor markets. They consider the growth in employment, real value added and real
wages growth for 28 industries from 63 countries between 1970 and 2003, from the Unido Indstat-
3 2006 database. Consistent with their model’s predictions, they find that standard measures of
financial development are associated with greater employment growth in externally dependent in-
dustries, although only in non-OECD countries. The finding suggests that financial development
matters only up to some threshold, as the most developed countries seem to be not affected. On
the other hand, they do not find any effect on labor productivity and real wage growth. Consistent
with the idea that financial development has a “dark side”, they find that employment growth
slows down significantly more during financial crises in externally dependent industries located in
financially developed countries. In essence, the sensitivity of growth to financial development has
both an upside and a downside.
The second strand of research our paper is related to studies the relationship between firm de-
cisions and investor sentiment. The extant literature shows that sentiment affects firm investment
decisions in at least three ways. First, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) point out that managers
may infer information from share prices. A price inflated with sentiment could therefore cause man-
agers to infer high expected cash flow or low discount rates, both of which would stimulate more
investment. Second, Polk and Sapienza (2009) contend that firm managers can increase short-term
firm value through catering to investor beliefs. Consistent with this idea, they find that periods
of high investor sentiment (defined as firm-level mispricing) prompt more investment, controlling
for investment opportunities and financial slack. Third, Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003) find that
stock prices have a stronger impact on the investment of “equity-dependent” firms, i.e. firms that
need external equity to finance marginal investments. In particular, such firms may forego invest-
ment if their securities are undervalued and even modify their capital structure accordingly (Baker
and Wurgler, 2002). Hence investment and external finance should both be increasing in sentiment.
This finding seems to hold outside the US as well, as Chirinko and Schaller (2001) find that the
1980s stock market boom in Japan led to high levels of investment.
However, none of the above papers look into the implications of sentiment-driven investment
on labor. Only recently McLean and Zhao (2014) try to address this issue. They find that both
investment and employment are less sensitive to Tobin’s q and more sensitive to cash flow during
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recessions and low investor sentiment periods. Their innovation lies in the fact that they (1) use
sentiment as a state variable and (2) let sentiment and fundamental variables interact with each
other. Also, they incorporate the insights of Lamont and Stein (2006), Shiller (2001) and Samuelson
(1998) and consider an aggregate measure of sentiment rather than some form of firm-level mispric-
ing, as opposed to Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003) and Polk and Sapienza (2009). However their
analysis of the labor market is only marginal and does not test whether sentiment has any causal
effect on labor.
In this paper we try to extend these studies. Since greater speculative demand implies higher
prices and lower cost of capital, we expect investor sentiment to play an important role in the labor
market. In order to derive some theoretical guidance, we introduce a modified version of Pagano
and Pica’s (2012) model to study the effect of sentiment on growth, in a setting with countries
with different levels of financial development and industries with either low or high productivity.
In fact, we combine the two above strands of literature. Consistent with the model predictions we
find that when US investor sentiment is high, there is a boost in employment growth worldwide but
a decrease in labor productivity. This is consistent with the idea that firms “over-hire” in times of
positive sentiment and correspondingly low cost of capital. We also find strong evidence consistent
with the idea that financial development has a dark side. In fact, the effect of financial crises on
growth is stronger following periods of high investor sentiment.
3 The model
This section first introduces the model with one industry and one country, then presents the exten-
sion to two industries and n countries.
3.1 One-industry one-country model
We consider the economy from Pagano and Pica (2012), where a manager/entrepreneur needs to
fund a project, but with two important differences. First, the project is risky and can fail with
probability pi. Second, we replace the banking sector with a stock market. Then the representative
risk-neutral manager-entrepreneur, in addition to his initial wealth I, needs to launch an IPO to
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fund the project3.
Workers can observe the firm’s cash flow, but shareholders cannot, which creates a moral hazard
problem. In particular, the manager can appropriate a fraction 1−λ of the firm’s operating profits.
Therefore, λ can be thought of as a measure of financial development, such as e.g. monitoring
ability or investor protection.
The timing is as follows. Upon receiving external funding F , the firm hires workers L. Then the
firm produces y˜, the manager gets private benefit B˜, workers get wL and shareholders receive the
remainder. In particular, firm’s revenues are generated by a Cobb-Douglas production function:
y˜ = θ˜K1−αLα (1)
where θ˜ is a parameter that captures firm profitability, K is the firm’s capital, given by the sum of
the manager’s initial wealth I plus the amount of equity funding F he can get, and L is the labor
demand of the firm. Profitability is stochastic and is distributed as:
θ˜ =
 θ 1− pi;0 pi. (2)
such that expected revenues are equal to:
E(y˜) = (1− pi)θK1−αLα ≡ θ¯K1−αLα (3)
where θ¯ ≡ (1− pi)θ. The manager maximizes his expected private benefits:
max
L
E(B˜) = (1− λ) (E(y˜)− wL) (4)
subject to the participation constraint E(B˜) ≥ I, where w represents workers’ wage in a perfectly
competitive labor market. The first-order condition yields:
L∗ =
(α
w
θ¯
) 1
1−α
K (5)
3Note that the arguments that follow would hold for SEOs as well. However, we use the IPO setting for ease of
exposition.
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which in turn implies the following private benefit for the manager:
E(B∗) = (1− λ)φK (6)
where φ represents the profit per dollar invested and is defined as:
φ ≡ (1− α)
(α
w
) α
1−α
θ¯
1
1−α (7)
The complement to (6) then represents pledgeable income, i.e. cash flow to external financiers:
E(v˜) = λφK ≡ v¯ (8)
Investors are risk-neutral and can be either arbitrageurs (type A) or noise traders (type B), whose
populations are normalized to have unit mass. The difference between these two groups is that the
arbitrageurs know the exact probability of default of the project, whereas noise traders estimate it
with a bias (pˆi 6= pi).
We consider a stock market from Hong and Sraer (2013), where investor j solves:
max
nj
nj(v¯j − p)− 1
2
n2j
γ
(9)
where n is the number of shares traded, γ captures transaction costs4, p is the stock price and v¯j is
his subjective evaluation of the stock:
v¯j =
 v¯ j = A;v¯s j = B. (10)
where s 6= 1 represents noise trader sentiment and using (8) can be defined as:
S =
v¯B
v¯
≡
(
1− pˆi
1− pi
) 1
1−α
(11)
4Note that a type of transaction cost that is characterized by a convex function as in (8) is the bid-ask spread, as
larger trades are typically associated with more unfavorable price movements.
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The first-order condition yields the optimal demand for the stock for investor j:
n∗j = γ(v¯j − p) (12)
Given unit stock supply, the equilibrium price is:
p∗ =
1 + s
2
v¯ − 1
2γ
(13)
or following from (8):
p∗ = SλφK − 1
2γ
(14)
where S ≡ 1+s
2
. Therefore, a positive bias in noise traders’ evaluations also inflates the equilibrium
price.
Since K∗ = I + F and F = p∗, then the firm’s optimal level of capital is:
K∗ =
(
I − 1
2γ
)
(1− λφS)−1 (15)
and, from (5), the optimal level of employment is:
L∗ =
(α
w
θ¯
) 1
1−α
(
I − 1
2γ
)
(1− λφS)−1 (16)
Note that (17) is made up of two pieces. One is set by the manager and incorporates the true
probability of default of the project. The other instead depends on the stock market and is therefore
affected by sentiment.
In equilibrium, investor sentiment increases the level of employment:
dL∗
dS
S
L∗
=
λφS
1− λφS + 1−(1−α)λφS
(1−α)
> 0 (17)
as long as the elasticity of labor supply () is finite5. The mechanism is as follows. For each
sentiment-driven euro received, a fraction 1− λ is kept by the manager and the rest is used to hire
new workers. However, if sentiment is positive, this leads to over-hiring because the demand for
5As in Pagano and Pica (2012), we do not model labor supply. Rather, we consider a generic upward-sloping
function.
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the firm’s product does not change with sentiment. Therefore, the firm becomes less profitable and
labor correspondingly less productive.
Note that the impact of sentiment on labor is an increasing function of two factors: (1) financial
development (λ), which strengthens the effect of financial markets on the real economy; (2) firm
profitability (φ), as more profitable firms are also those that rely more on the stock market.
3.2 Two-industry n-country model
Next, we analyze an economy with n countries and two industries. The n countries differ in their
level of financial development λ, while the two industries are characterized by high and low pro-
ductivity respectively (θ1 > θ2). Workers cannot move freely across industries because employment
in a given industry requires specific and irreversible investments in training. The high-productivity
industry thus hires high-skill workers, and pays a wage premium:
dw∗
dθ
θ
w∗
=
1
(1− λφS)(1− α)+ 1− (1− α)λφS > 0 (18)
whose size is related to the elasticity of labor supply . On the other hand, countries with higher
financial development pay higher wages:
dw∗
dλ
λ
w∗
=
λφS
(1− λφS)+ 1−(1−α)λφS
1−α
> 0 (19)
Therefore, the optimal hiring strategy for a high-productivity firm is to seek high-skill labor in
countries that feature: (1) lower financial development; and (2) higher elasticity of labor supply in
the high-productivity industry, i.e. a greater net supply of high-skill labor. A symmetrical argument
applies to low-productivity firms.
This strategy implies two potential patterns of wage growth in the country in which the firm
invests. Consider the country’s average wage at time t:
wt =
∑
i=1,2
wiLit∑
i=1,2 Lit
≡ w2 + δt(w1 − w2) (20)
where wi is the competitive equilibrium wage in industry i; Lit is the number of workers currently
employed in industry i; and δt is the fraction of high-skill workers over total workforce in the country.
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If a foreign firm hires new local employees at time t+ ∆, wage growth between t and t+ ∆ is:
wt+∆ − wt
wt
=
δt+∆ − δt
δt +
w2
w1−w2
(21)
whose sign depends on δt+∆ − δt. Then, wage growth will be positive if the foreign firm picks local
high-skill workers, and negative otherwise. This implies that an increase in labor demand from
foreign firms should be followed by positive wage growth in countries with greater net supply of
high-skill labor, but negative wage growth in other countries.
Note that investor sentiment plays an important role in this picture. If the hiring firm faces
positive investor sentiment in its local stock market, it finds it optimal to invest more and hire new
workers. But as long as the firm carries out part of its operations abroad, its decisions have an
impact on labor and wages in foreign countries. Therefore, local sentiment can have a global effect.
3.3 Model predictions
The main predictions from the model can be summarized as follows. An increase in investor
sentiment should lead to: (1) higher employment growth worldwide, especially in countries with
higher financial development (λ) and industries that rely more on capital markets (K); (2) lower
labor productivity, as the firm chooses a sub-optimal level of employment and thus becomes less
profitable; (3) positive wage growth in countries with a greater proportion of high-skill labor, but
negative wage growth otherwise. Next, we take these predictions to the data.
4 Data and methods
Our empirical analysis studies the effects of US investor sentiment on labor markets worldwide.
The reason we choose the US as our reference country is that it represents one of most financially
developed economies and its firms typically carry out a nontrivial part of their operations abroad.
Also, the US is virtually the only country for which a widely accepted measure of investor sentiment
is available (Baker and Wurgler, 2006, 2007; Baker, Wurgler and Yuan, 2012).
In order to analyze the effect of US sentiment on non-US labor markets, we consider a large
panel of countries from the Unido Indstat-3 database (United Nations Industrial Development Or-
ganization, Industrial Statistics), which spans the period 1970-2003. Following Pagano and Pica
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(2012) we consider the 2006 release, as the following ones have more missing observations. We
analyze 28 industries and only consider countries for which at least 10 observations are available,
for a total 113 countries6. The dataset provides annual country-level statistics on the growth in
employment, real wages and real value added.
We measure investor sentiment using Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) index, which they define as
the “propensity to speculate” and captures changes in asset demand not explained by fundamen-
tals. This measure is orthogonalized to several macroeconomic variables and based on a number of
sentiment proxies suggested in previous works, including: the closed-end fund discount; the NYSE
share turnover; the number and average first-day returns on IPOs; the equity share in new issues;
and the dividend premium.
One major advantage of this measure in our setting is that it is unlikely to suffer from reverse
causality issues. In fact, the reverse causality story would be that US investor sentiment may rise
in anticipation of improving world economic conditions. However, the index is orthogonalized to
US economic indicators. Since the US economy is integrated with the rest of the world, it appears
unlikely that the index might reflect the future state of the economy in foreign countries. Further-
more, we find that sentiment predicts a worldwide decrease in the efficiency of labor – lower labor
productivity. This feature also appears to be an unlikely driver of US investor sentiment.
Table 1 presents some sample statistics. The sample size includes more than sixty thousand
observations, of which almost two thirds are for non-OECD countries. The average annual em-
ployment growth in the full sample is 2.05%. However, there is a sharp difference between OECD
countries and non-OECD countries. The former exhibit near-zero growth (-0.15%) whereas the
latter has strong positive growth (3.19%). Average real value added growth is 3.80% in the full
sample and is fairly stable across both OECD and non-OECD countries (2.98% vs. 4.20%). Labor
productivity is 1.76% overall, but it is much higher for OECD countries (3.25%) than it is for
6The countries we consider are: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium,
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina-Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile,
China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,
Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,
Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Romania,
Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland,
Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom,
United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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non-OECD countries (1.00%). Average wage growth is 1.37% for the full sample, but again it is
much stronger for OECD countries (3.10%) than for non-OECD countries (0.50%). Interestingly,
non-OECD countries exhibit a higher standard deviation and a wider range across all four measures
considered.
Our baseline specification is as follows:
ycit = β0 + β1St−1 + β2sharecit−1 + β3FDc + β4EDi + β5(FDc × EDi)+
β6(St−1 × FDc) + β7(St−1 × EDi) + β8(St−1 × FDc × EDi)+
µct + µi + cit
(22)
where ycit represents the following four dependent variables in country c, sector i at time t: employ-
ment growth; real value added growth; labor productivity, defined as the difference between real
value added growth and employment growth; and real wages growth. The other variables are as
follows: sharecit−1 denotes the industry’s share of ycit in the manufacturing sector in the previous
year; St−1 is Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) index of investor sentiment, orthogonalized to business
cycle indicators and lagged one year; FDc is financial development of country c, defined as stock
market capitalization over GDP (1980-95 average); EDi is external dependence of firms in sector
i, defined as in Rajan and Zingales (1998) as the reliance on external finance of US listed firms in
the Compustat database; µct and µi are country-year and sector fixed effects respectively. Standard
errors are clustered by country.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Investor sentiment, financial development, and external depen-
dence
Table 2 presents the main results. In Panel A, we find that employment growth seems indeed
to be affected by sentiment. A one standard deviation increase in sentiment in a given year is
followed by an increase in employment growth worldwide by 3.29% (t-stat 3.93). The effect is more
pronounced for developing countries (4.05%, t-stat 2.79) than for developed countries (2.69%, t-stat
4.94). This is consistent with the model’s prediction that following high sentiment, countries with
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higher financial development have an incentive to hire workers in countries with lower financial
development. Interestingly, however, sentiment does not affect much real value added growth. The
coefficient for the full sample is positive but not significant (1.15%, t-stat 1.46). However, it is near-
zero for OECD countries (-0.29%, t-stat -0.47) but positive and significant for non-OECD countries
(2.27%, t-stat 2.03). Therefore, it seems that the economies of developing countries are stimulated
by US investor sentiment.
In Table 2, Panel B, we find that labor productivity is negatively affected by sentiment. In
fact, a 1% standard deviation increase in US investor sentiment is followed by a decrease in labor
productivity by 2.46% (t-stat -2.69). The effect is quite similar across OECD countries (-2.96%,
t-stat -6.47) and non-OECD countries (-2.20%, t-stat -1.29), except that the latter is not significant.
Finally, the effect of sentiment on real wage growth is negative overall. A 1% standard deviation
increase in sentiment is followed by a decrease in wage growth by 2.91% (t-stat -3.36) and the effect
is similar across OECD countries (-2.94%, -3.71) and non-OECD countries (-3.22%, t-stat -2.02).
Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that financial development helps industries that rely more on
external finance grow disproportionately faster than other industries. Pagano and Pica (2012)
document that this finding applies not only to real value added growth, but also to employment
growth – even though only for non-OECD countries. The model we propose suggests that in the
presence of sentiment this measure should have an even stronger effect. To test this conjecture,
Table 2 includes a triple interaction term between a country’s level of financial development, an
industry’s need for external finance and lagged US investor sentiment. We find that employment
growth is 3.26% higher (t-stat 2.11) for externally dependent industries in financially developed
countries, but the effect increases by another 2.23% (t-stat 2.18) when conditioning on sentiment.
A breakdown in OECD vs. non-OECD countries shows that the result is essentially driven by the
latter (2.42%, t-stat 1.95), as the coefficient become insignificant for OECD countries (1.45%, t-stat
1.55). On the other hand, the triple interaction term seems to have no effect on the other dependent
variables we consider. Overall, these results complement Pagano and Pica’s (2012) findings.
5.2 Investor sentiment and real wages growth
There is a widespread consensus among economists that a significant driving force behind increases
in private productivity is research and development (R&D) activity. The so-called “Nordic coun-
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tries”, i.e. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, are a leading example in this respect.
They traditionally exhibit some of the highest rates of research and development expenditure in
the world, both per capita and scaled by GDP, high education expenditure, and a high quality of
institutions characterized by a legal system of their own, the Scandinavian one .
In light of this, we test whether the effect of investor sentiment on wages differs in this peculiar
subset of countries as opposed to the rest of the sample. In particular, we expect Nordic coun-
tries to exhibit a higher share of high-skill labor, and thus experience positive real wages growth
following high US investor sentiment. The results are in Table 3, columns (1) and (2). We find
that a one standard deviation increase in investor sentiment is followed by an increase in real wages
growth by 1.07% in Nordic countries (t-stat 2.87), but it is followed by a decrease in real wages
growth by 3.02% in the rest of the sample (t-stat -3.38). This pattern is consistent with the model’s
cross-sectional predictions.
We also propose another test of these predictions based on a country’s financial development. In
fact, a more developed financial system typically relies on a higher fraction of high-skilled workers.
Therefore, we split the sample in two subsamples: the most financially developed economies on
the one hand, defined as the set of countries characterized by the top 5% ratio of stock market
capitalization over GDP; and the less developed economies on the other hand, defined as the rest of
the sample. The results are in Table 3, columns (3) and (4). We find that a one standard deviation
increase in investor sentiment is followed by a sharp increase in real wages growth by 13.07% in the
most financially developed economies (t-stat 17.27), but it is followed by a decrease in real wages
growth by 3.01% in the rest of the sample (t-stat -3.64). The results are again consistent with the
model’s cross-sectional predictions.
5.3 Investor sentiment and investments in foreign countries
It is important to shed light on the channel through which US investor sentiment affects employ-
ment abroad. There are two natural candidates: US foreign direct investments and US portfolio
investments. Portfolio investments are passive investments, in the sense that they not entail active
management of the firm and their only purpose is the pursuit of a financial gain. On the contrary,
foreign direct investments allow investors to exercise a certain degree of influence and control (at
least 10%) over the company, including employment decisions.
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The mechanism is as follows. The model predicts that the manager, upon observing positive
sentiment, should hire more workers in his foreign subsidiaries. However, the effect might not be
equal across subsidiaries located in different countries. In fact, other things being equal, the man-
ager should prefer countries in which the firm finds it more advantageous to carry out its operations.
Therefore, the impact of investor sentiment on employment should be stronger in countries in which
the US invests more. In order to test for this effect empirically, we interact Baker and Wurgler’s
(2006) measure of investor sentiment with the level of US investments in a given foreign country.
To this purpose, we use US foreign direct investments data from the Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis. In particular, we consider two series: a general one, defined as the direct investment position
abroad on a historical-cost basis (US FDI), available as of 1983 and expressed in USD billions;
and a more labor-specific one, defined as the direct investment in employment at majority-owned
nonbank foreign affiliates (US FDIL), available as of 1998 and expressed in millions of employees.
Due to the sharp difference in sample size, we pick US FDI as our main specification. However, we
show that all the results carry over for US FDIL too.
On the other hand, we retrieve data on US portfolio investments data (US PI) from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, expressed in USD billions. The
series, however, have two major issues: they are only available as of 1997 and many observations
are missing.
On the other hand, we also need to take into account the potential impact of country-specific
sentiment. If a given country’s investors are over-optimistic, and the country structurally relies on
foreign capital, then foreign investors might want to exploit local sentiment and invest more in that
country. In order to account for a country’s reliance on foreign capital, we consider country-level
net foreign direct investments (net FDI), defined as the difference between FDI made abroad by
a given country and FDI received from foreign countries. In fact, if FDI inflows are consistently
greater than FDI outflows, the country has a strong need for foreign capital in order to grow – as
opposed to a country which also has a comparable amount of FDI outflows.
We consider the series of net FDI from the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments
database, supplemented by data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
and official national sources, and expressed in USD billions. On the other hand, we exploit the
fact that Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) measure of investor sentiment is positively correlated with
sentiment measures from a few other major economies (Baker, Wurgler and Yu, 2012). Therefore,
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it can interpreted as a (noisy) proxy for local sentiment. According to this story, the impact of
sentiment on employment should be stronger for countries with negative net FDI. In fact, sentiment
should matter more for countries that receive more foreign investments, not necessarily from the
US. In order to capture this effect, we introduce an interaction term between investor sentiment
and net FDI.
The results are in Table 4. In column (1), the dependent variable is employment growth. The
coefficient of the interaction term between US investor sentiment and US FDI is positive and highly
significant (0.0006, t-stat 3.47), and explains away the effect of investor sentiment alone (0.0053,
t-stat 0.35). Therefore, the effect of US investor sentiment on local employment is zero for countries
that receive no US foreign direct investments. However, if we consider countries that attract one
standard deviation of US foreign direct investments (32.92 USD millions), a one standard deviation
increase in US investor sentiment is followed by a 1.98% increase in employment growth. The effect
is then quite sizeable.
Interestingly, the coefficient of the interaction term between investor sentiment and net FDI is
negative and also highly significant (-5.03e-13, t-stat -2.94), even though its magnitude is rather
small. In fact, for countries that attract one standard deviation of net foreign direct investments
(9.38 USD billions), a one standard deviation increase in US investor sentiment is followed by a
0.01% increase in employment growth. Hence, even though the two sentiment stories proposed
above might actually co-exist, the effect through US FDI seems to be largely dominant.
The coefficient of the interaction between US FDI and net FDI is negative and significant (-
1.12e-14, t-stat -2.58), which suggests that the impact of US FDI on employment growth is stronger
for economies that rely more on foreign capital, independently of the presence of sentiment. We
also interact US FDI with the two key variables from the previous literature, financial development
(FD) and external dependence (ED). The coefficient of the interaction term between US FDI and
FD is also positive, but not significant (0.0003, t-stat 0.34). The coefficient of the interaction term
between US FDI and ED is positive and significant (0.0003, t-stat 3.44), which suggests that FDI
should matter more for industries that are structurally more dependent on external capital.
In Table 4, column (2), we run the same regression for real value added growth. The coefficient of
the interaction term between investor sentiment and US FDI is positive but not significant (0.0001,
t-stat 0.16). The coefficient of sentiment alone is not significant and even flips sign (-0.0172, t-stat
-0.79). The coefficient of the interaction term between investor sentiment and net FDI is also not
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significant and flips sign (-1.07e-13, t-stat -0.30). The only coefficient that is (marginally) significant
is that of the interaction term between US FDI and ED (0.0003, t-stat 1.75).
The results for labor productivity are in Table 4, column (3). The coefficient of the interaction
term between investor sentiment and US FDI is negative and marginally significant (-0.0005, t-stat
-1.67). The coefficient of the interaction term between investor sentiment and net FDI is positive
but not significant (5.19e-13, t-stat 1.19). Interestingly, the coefficient of investor sentiment alone
is negative and marginally significant (-0.0320, t-stat -1.72). The results suggest that the US FDI
channel can explain, at least in part, the drop in labor productivity that follows high investor sen-
timent, while the net FDI channel cannot. However, it seems that investor sentiment alone still
accounts for part of the picture. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in US investor
sentiment is followed by a 3.20% decrease in labor productivity. However, the effect is 1.65% larger
in absolute value for countries that attract one standard deviation of US foreign direct investments.
In Table 4, column (4), we test whether the above measures affect real wages growth. We find
that the coefficient of the interaction term between investor sentiment and US FDI is negative but
not significant (-0.0003, t-stat -1.18). The coefficient of investor sentiment alone is also negative
but slightly outside the rejection region (-0.0371, t-stat -1.54). The coefficient of the interaction
term between investor sentiment and net FDI is positive but not significant (1.59e-13, t-stat 0.34).
Next, we repeat the same analysis but replace US FDI with its labor-specific counterpart, US
FDIL. The results for employment growth are in Table 5, column (1). The coefficient of the in-
teraction term between investor sentiment and US FDIL is positive and significant (0.0601, t-stat
1.99). On the contrary, the coefficient of investor sentiment alone is positive but not significant
(0.0045, t-stat 0.22). The coefficient of the interaction term between investor sentiment and net
FDI is positive but not significant (8.08e-14, t-stat 0.44). Therefore, the only effect that survives
in this specification is the one for the foreign direct investments channel. In particular, for coun-
tries that attract one standard deviation of US foreign direct investments in labor (0.36 millions
of employees), a one standard deviation increase in US investor sentiment is followed by a 2.16%
increase in employment growth. Interestingly, the magnitude of this effect is quite similar to that
from Table 4.
The results for real value added growth are in Table 5, column (2). The coefficient of the inter-
action term between investor sentiment and US FDIL is negative but not significant (-0.0812, t-stat
-1.18). The coefficient of investor sentiment alone is negative but not significant (-0.0162, t-stat
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-0.64). The coefficient of the interaction term between investor sentiment and net FDI is positive
but not significant (4.57e-13, t-stat 0.66).
In Table 5, column (3), we run the regression for labor productivity. The coefficient of the in-
teraction term between investor sentiment and US FDIL is negative and significant (-0.1310, t-stat
-2.03). Interestingly, this result is statistically stronger than its counterpart from Table 4. The
coefficient of investor sentiment alone is negative but slightly outside the rejection region (-0.0349,
t-stat -1.51). The coefficient of the interaction term between investor sentiment and net FDI is
positive but not significant (7.46e-13, t-stat 1.06). Again, the foreign direct investments channel is
the only hypothesis that explains the results.
In Table 5, column (4), we report the results for real wages growth. The coefficient of the
interaction term between investor sentiment and US FDIL is negative and marginally significant (-
0.0915, t-stat -1.66). Similarly, the coefficient of investor sentiment alone is negative and marginally
significant (-0.0571, t-stat -1.65). The coefficient of the interaction term between investor sentiment
and net FDI is positive but not significant (7.74e-13, t-stat 1.27).
Next, we test the portfolio investments channel hypothesis. The results for employment growth
are in Table 6, column (1). The coefficient of the interaction term between investor sentiment
and US PI is not significant and even flips sign (-0.0001, t-stat -0.41). Similarly, the coefficient of
the interaction term between investor sentiment and net FDI is not significant and turns negative
(-7.77e-13, t-stat -0.64). The coefficient of sentiment alone instead is positive, but again not signif-
icant (0.0347, t-stat 0.87). Similarly, in columns (2) and (4) we find no statistical significance for
the results for real value added growth and real wages growth. The only significant coefficient is in
column (3), where we find that investor sentiment alone exerts a negative and significant effect on
labor productivity (-0.0909, t-stat -2.33).
Overall, the foreign direct investment channel hypothesis explains most of our findings, with
the only exception of labor productivity – for which investor sentiment alone is also significant. On
the contrary, we find no evidence for the portfolio investments channel hypothesis. Since portfolio
investments are effectively stock market investments, they should be particularly sensitive to local
sentiment. Therefore, these findings suggest that it is indeed US investor sentiment, rather than
local sentiment, that drives our results. Consistent with this interpretation, the country-specific
sentiment hypothesis finds no support in the data either, with the only exception of employment
growth in the US FDI setting. However, the magnitude is tiny and its explanatory power goes away
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in the labor-specific US FDIL regressions.
5.4 Country popularity
Hwang (2011) proposes an index of foreign country’s popularity among Americans (“Country Pop-
ularity Score”) and shows that it is correlated with US firms’ investments in that country. His
measure is based on a Gallup survey, which entails telephone interviews with a national represen-
tative adult sample of 1,007 people. In the survey, respondents are asked the following question
regarding 42 countries: “Is your overall opinion of country X very favorable, mostly favorable,
mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?”. Then, he constructs a Country Popularity Score as the
sum of the percentage of survey participants in the US thinking very favorably of a country mul-
tiplied by four, most favorably of a country multiplied by three, mostly unfavorably of a country
multiplied by two, and very unfavorably of a country multiplied by one.
His sample covers 17 countries from 1992 to 2008. Then he calculates the correlation between
a given country’s popularity score and its population, defined as the logarithm of a country’s pop-
ulation; its distance from the US, defined as the logarithm of the distance in kilometers between
Washington, DC, and the country’s capital city; its language, defined as a dummy variable that
equals one if English is the country’s official language or one of the country’s primary languages; its
religion, defined as a dummy that equals one if a country is predominantly Christian; its cultural
distance from the US, defined as the difference in the Hofstede Index7 between the US and the coun-
try in question; its governance quality, defined as the Corruption Perceptions Index as published
by Transparency International; the fraction of the Gallup survey participants who feel they do not
have sufficient information to form an overall opinion of a country and opt for “no opinion”; the
fraction of US citizens with ancestors from the country in question. He finds that the dimensions
that correlate significantly with a country’s popularity score are cultural distance (-0.80, p-value
< 0.01), governance quality (0.72, p-value < 0.01), language (0.42, p-value < 0.10), and ancestry
(0.42, p-value < 0.10).
Note that country popularity might matter in our setting too. When sentiment is higher, and
capital is correspondingly cheaper, a firm’s manager decides to invest more in countries in which
he finds it more advantageous to invest, i.e. those in which the firm makes more FDI. However, if
7The Hofstede Index measures a country’s culture along the following five dimensions: power distance, individu-
alism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation.
24
two countries receive the same level of FDI from the firm, the manager will tend to prefer the one
that ranks higher in terms of popularity. In fact, even if he is not prone to the country popularity
bias himself, he can cater to the part of his investor base who is (e.g. noise traders).
In light of this, we check whether the effect of sentiment-driven US foreign direct investments is
stronger in more popular countries. However, we decide not to use the Gallup survey in our analysis
because of the following concerns: (1) most series are available only as of the early 1990s, whereas
our sample starts in 1970; (2) many observations are missing; (3) relatively few foreign countries
are covered, and certainly much fewer than those in our sample (42 vs. 113). Instead, we proxy
popularity using variables that are similar to the ones analyzed by Hwang (2011).
In particular, we rate a country’s popularity along the following three dimensions from La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998): a country’s institutional framework, defined
as a dummy that takes on value one if the country has British legal origin; quality of institutions,
defined as the International Country Risk guide’s assessment of the corruption in a country’s gov-
ernment, where lower scores indicate that “high government officials are likely to demand special
payments” and “illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government” in
the form of “bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment,
policy protection, or loans”; democratic score, defined as the Data Sharing for Demographic Re-
search Polity III index, and constructed as the average of two indicators of regime type (autocracy
and democracy) and eight indicators of political authority (regulation of executive recruitment, com-
petitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, monocratism, constraints
on the chief executive, regulation of political participation, competitiveness of political participa-
tion, and centralization of state authority).
The intuition is that US investors should hold a given foreign country in higher regard if it
appears to promote values that are popular in the US, such as honesty and democracy, as well as
feature a similar institutional framework. Note that the first two measures capture the two dimen-
sions that exhibit higher correlation with Hwang’s (2011) country popularity score, i.e. cultural
distance and governance quality. This strategy also allows us to avoid the low frequency issues of
the Gallup survey, keep most of our countries and exploit the full length of our sample period.
If country popularity matters in our framework, the effect of sentiment on employment should
be larger for countries with British legal origin, above-median quality of institutions and above-
median democracy score. We test this hypothesis in Table 7. In columns (1) and (2) we break
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the sample into countries with British and non-British legal origin respectively. The estimates for
the subsample of countries with British legal origin are strikingly similar to the results for the full
sample. The effect of US investor sentiment on employment growth is positive but not significant
(0.0149, t-stat 0.45); the coefficient of the interaction term between US investor sentiment and US
FDI is positive and highly significant (0.0007, t-stat 3.91); the coefficient of the interaction term
between US investor sentiment and net FDI is negative but slightly outside the rejection region
(-6.26e-13, t-stat -1.42); the coefficient of the interaction term between US FDI and net FDI is neg-
ative and highly significant (-1.15e-14, t-stat -3.23); the coefficient of the interaction term between
US FDI and ED is positive and highly significant (0.0003, t-stat 2.92); and the coefficient between
US FDI and FD is positive but not significant (0.0008, t-stat 1.34). The results for the subsample
of countries with non-British legal origin feature two important differences: the coefficient of the
interaction term between US investor sentiment and US FDI is no longer significant and even flips
sign (-0.0006, t-stat -1.37); and the coefficient of the interaction term between US FDI and ED is
positive but no longer significant (0.0006, t-stat 1.31). Therefore, sentiment-induced US FDI only
affect employment growth in countries with British legal origin.
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 we split the sample into countries with above-median and
below-median quality of institutions respectively. The results for the subsample of countries with
above-median quality of institutions are similar to those for the full sample, with the only exception
of the coefficient of US investor sentiment – which is positive and marginally significant (0.0173,
t-stat 1.74). The coefficient of the interaction term between US investor sentiment and US FDI
is positive and significant (0.0004, t-stat 3.57); the coefficient of the interaction term between US
investor sentiment and net FDI is negative and significant (-3.88e-13, t-stat -2.44); the coefficient
of the interaction term between US FDI and net FDI is negative and significant (-7.37e-15, t-stat
-1.98); the coefficient of the interaction term between US FDI and ED is positive and marginally
significant (0.0001, t-stat 1.69); and the coefficient of the interaction term between US FDI and FD
is negative and not significant (-0.0005, t-stat -0.56).
In the subsample of countries with below-median quality of institutions, all the coefficients lose
their significance, with the only exception of the interaction term between US investor sentiment
and net FDI, which is marginally significant (9.66e-12, t-stat 1.67) and flips sign. The coefficient of
the interaction term between US investor sentiment and US FDI is no longer significant and even
flips sign (-0.0005, t-stat -0.21); and the coefficient of the interaction term between US FDI and ED
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is positive but no longer significant (0.0045, t-stat 1.56). Therefore, the joint impact of US FDI and
US investor sentiment on foreign labor is only present in countries with high quality of institutions.
Similarly, sentiment alone and its interaction term with net FDI only affects employment growth
in the first subsample, but not in the second one.
Finally, in columns (5) and (6) of Table 7 we break the sample into countries with above-median
and below-median democracy score respectively. In the subsample of countries with above-median
democracy score, only two coefficients are positive and significant: the interaction term between
US investor sentiment and US FDI (0.0003, t-stat 2.04), and the interaction term between US FDI
and ED (0.0002, t-stat 3.00). In the subsample of countries with below-median democracy score,
instead, none of the coefficients are significant at any conventional level.
Overall, then, the results are consistent with Hwang’s (2011) finding that US firms tend to invest
more in countries that are more popular among Americans. In fact, the impact of investor sentiment
on employment growth is only present in the subsample of countries that are more popular in the
US.
A line of reasoning suggests that our dimensions of popularity pick the “best” countries in the
world, which in turn are more likely to attract US investments in the first place. However, positive
sentiment typically increases demand for investments that are characterized by an overall lower
quality (see e.g. Baker and Wurgler, 2006, 2007). If anything, then, the breakdown we propose
should go against our results.
As a robustness check, we replace US FDI with its labor-specific counterpart, US FDIL, and per-
form the same sample breakdown. The results are in Table 8. Due to the much smaller sample size,
many of the coefficients of our variables of interest are no longer significant. However, the impact of
the interaction term between US investor sentiment and US FDIL on employment growth follows a
strikingly similar pattern to that from Table 7. In fact, the coefficient is positive and significant for
the subsample of countries with British legal origin (0.0854, t-stat 2.65), high quality of institutions
(0.0607, t-stat 2.02), and high democracy score (0.0710, t-stat 1.88), and not significant otherwise.
On the other hand, the coefficient of investor sentiment alone is only significant for countries with
British legal origin (-0.0570, t-stat 1.99), whereas the coefficient of the interaction term between
investor sentiment and net FDI is not significant in any of the subsamples. The findings support
the idea that it is indeed US suboptimal investments in foreign labor that drive our main results.
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5.5 Investor sentiment and employment during financial crises
Previous literature shows that financial development may have a “dark side”. Braun and Larrain
(2005) find that the more financially dependent industries are hit harder in recessions but that
this effect is less severe in countries with high accounting standards and in industries with more
tangible assets. Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel (2007) find that sectors that are heavily dependent
on external finance suffer a much sharper contraction of value added in countries with a higher
degree of financial development. Pagano and Pica (2012) find that the same effects carry over, to
some extent, on employment growth and real wages growth, which slow down significantly more in
financially dependent industries during financial crises.
In light of these results, we conjecture that a financial crisis in a given country has a stronger
negative effect on growth, conditional on the level of sentiment-driven US FDI that the country
received in the previous year. To this purpose, we consider the list of country-level banking crises
from Laeven and Valencia (2010).
The results for employment growth are in Table 9, column (1). As in the baseline specification,
we find that the interaction term between US investor sentiment and US FDI is positive and highly
significant (0.0006, t-stat 4.28). However, when a financial crises hits, sentiment-driven US FDI
prompts a highly significant drop in employment growth (-0.0008, t-stat -2.82). In particular, for
countries that receive one standard deviation of US foreign direct investments, a one standard
deviation increase in sentiment in the previous year amplifies the impact of a crisis on employment
growth in the following year by 2.63%.
Interestingly, neither a country’s financial development nor an industry’s external dependence
seem to have an impact on the severity of a crisis: the coefficient of the interaction term between
external dependence and the crisis dummy is positive and not significant (0.0104, t-stat 0.47), and
neither is the coefficient of the interaction term between financial development, external dependence
and the crisis dummy (-0.0202, t-stat -0.50).
The results for real value added growth are in Table 9, column (2). The interaction term between
US investor sentiment and US FDI is positive but not significant (0.0002, t-stat 0.82). However, a
financial crisis conditional on sentiment-driven US FDI is associated with a large decrease in real
value added growth (-0.0018, t-stat -2.87). In particular, for countries that receive one standard
deviation of US foreign direct investments, a one standard deviation increase in sentiment in the
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previous year amplifies the impact of a crisis on real value added growth in the following year by
5.93%.
Again, neither a country’s financial development nor an industry’s external dependence seem
to exacerbate the effect of financial crises: the coefficient of the interaction term between financial
development, external dependence and the crisis dummy is negative but not significant (-0.1070,
t-stat -0.88), whereas the coefficient of the interaction term between external dependence and the
crisis dummy is positive and not significant (0.0310, t-stat 0.68).
In Table 9, column (3), we find that conditional on the previous year’s level of sentiment-driven
US FDI, labor productivity exhibits a larger drop during financial crises (-0.0010, t-stat -1.72). In
particular, for countries that receive one standard deviation of US foreign direct investments, a one
standard deviation increase in sentiment in the previous year amplifies the impact of a crisis on
labor productivity in the following year by 3.29%. On the contrary, an industry’s dependence on
external funds does not exacerbate the impact of a crisis (-0.0310, t-stat 0.68), and neither does a
country’s level of financial development (-0.0807, t-stat -0.87).
In Table 9, column (4), we analyze the effect of crises on real wages growth. We find that the
coefficient of the interaction term between investor sentiment, US FDI and the crisis dummy is
negative and significant (-0.0010, t-stat -2.46). In particular, for countries that receive one standard
deviation of US foreign direct investments, a one standard deviation increase in sentiment in the
previous year amplifies the impact of a crisis on real wages growth in the following year by 3.29%.
On the other hand, the coefficient of the interaction term between financial development, external
dependence and the crisis dummy is negative but not significant (-0.0299, t-stat -0.97), and neither
is the coefficient of the interaction term between external dependence and the crisis dummy (0.0157,
t-stat 1.28).
Next, we test whether the detrimental effect of crises on employment growth is more pronounced
for countries that are more popular among US investors. The results are in Table 10. We find that
the coefficient of the interaction term between investor sentiment, US FDI and the crisis dummy is
negative and significant for countries with British legal origin (-0.0276, t-stat -2.02), above-median
quality of institutions (-0.0006, t-stat -2.77), and above-median democracy score (-0.0005, t-stat
-1.96), but not significant otherwise. The coefficient of the interaction term between financial
development, external dependence and the crisis dummy is not significant in any of the subsamples,
and neither is the coefficient of the interaction terms between external dependence and the crisis
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dummy. Then, we find that the same subsets of countries that benefit the most from sentiment-
driven US FDI are also the ones that are hit the hardest by financial crises.
Overall, the findings support the idea that finance has a dark side. The results complement those
of Braun and Larrain (2005) and Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel (2007), as we find a negative
effect of financial crises on growth. In particular, we document a detrimental effect on employment
growth and real wages growth as in Pagano and Pica (2012). However, our results differ from theirs
in two important ways: (1) we find strong, rather than mild, statistical evidence for the detrimental
effect of financial crises on growth; (2) we show that controlling for investor sentiment and the
channel through which it affects growth, both financial development and external dependence lose
their explanatory power.
6 Conclusion
We find that in a world with moral hazard and noise traders, investor sentiment should affect a
firm’s employment policy. Consistent with the model’s predictions, we show that higher US senti-
ment leads to higher employment growth worldwide. However, the increase in employment is not
justified by economic fundamentals. In fact, firms hire a suboptimal number of employees, which
leads to a general decrease in labor productivity. The effect of sentiment on wage growth is mixed.
In fact, following high sentiment, wage growth increases in countries with a higher proportion of
high-skill workers but decreases in other countries. The intuition is that it is optimal for firms to
hire workers in countries where the particular type of work they look for (high-skill or low-skill) is
in greater net supply, which then creates a cross-sectional pattern.
We also document that sentiment exacerbates the effect of financial crises on labor, especially for
firms that rely more on external finance. This is consistent with the idea that financial development
has a dark side, i.e. the firms that benefit the most from financial development are also the ones
that are hit the hardest during financial crises. Our findings suggest that sentiment amplifies this
mechanism.
Interestingly, we find that all the effects are especially strong in countries that attract more for-
eign direct investments from the US and that rank high in terms of popularity among US investors.
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A Appendix
Table 1. Sample statistics
Sample statistics for employment growth (Panel A), real value added growth (Panel B), labor productivity (Panel C) and real wage
growth (Panel D) from the Unido Indstat-3 (United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Industrial Statistics) 2006 database.
The dataset includes 28 industries and 113 countries. The sample period is 1970-2003.
Panel A. Employment growth
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Full sample 61626 0.0205 0.2594 -5.3122 6.5796
OECD 20970 -0.0015 0.1338 -3.2355 2.2907
Non-OECD 40656 0.0319 0.3040 -5.3122 6.5796
Panel B. Real value added growth
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Full sample 64105 0.0380 0.4128 -22.8624 8.1424
OECD 21145 0.0298 0.2364 -4.0404 3.8498
Non-OECD 42960 0.0420 0.4761 -22.8625 8.1424
Panel C. Labor productivity
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Full sample 61626 0.0176 0.3289 -7.7062 5.3125
OECD 20970 0.0325 0.2070 -4.2949 3.8942
Non-OECD 40656 0.0100 0.3764 -7.7062 5.3125
Panel D. Real wage growth
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Full sample 59417 0.0137 0.2723 -14.9357 4.8288
OECD 20061 0.0310 0.1508 -1.8079 3.2429
Non-OECD 39356 0.0050 0.3164 -14.9357 4.8288
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Table 2. Investor sentiment and growth
Panel regression of employment growth (Panel A, columns 1-3), real value added growth (Panel A,
columns 4-6), labor productivity (Panel B, columns 1-3), defined as the difference between real value
added growth and employment growth, and real wages growth (Panel B, columns 4-6), on lagged US
investor sentiment (S), defined as Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) index orthogonalized to US business
cycle indicators and normalized to have zero mean and unit variance. The dataset includes three-digit
industries for 113 countries for the period 1970-2003 from the Unido Indstat-3 (United Nations Industrial
Development Organization, Industrial Statistics) 2006 database. The controls are: country-year and
sector fixed effects; financial development (FD), defined as stock market capitalization over GDP (1980-
95 average); external dependence (ED), defined as in Rajan and Zingales (1998) as the reliance on
external finance of US listed firms in the Compustat database; the interaction between the two (FD x
ED); the industry’s share of the dependent variable in the manufacturing sector in the previous year.
Standard errors are clustered by country. In both panels, columns (1) and (4) report the results for the
full sample; columns (2) and (5) report the results for the subsample of OECD countries; columns (3)
and (6) report the results for the subsample of non-OECD countries.
Panel A
Employment Growth Real Value Added Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full OECD Non-OECD Full OECD Non-OECD
Share (-1) -0.2335*** -0.1025*** -0.3247*** -0.5452*** -0.3876*** -0.6708***
(-4.34) (-2.79) (-4.37) (-6.40) (-3.93) (-5.63)
FD x ED 0.0326** 0.0100 0.0395** 0.0517** -0.0085 0.0672***
(2.11) (0.81) (1.97) (2.57) (-0.48) (2.59)
S (-1) 0.0329*** 0.0269*** 0.0405*** 0.0115 -0.0029 0.0227**
(3.93) (4.94) (2.79) (1.46) (-0.47) (2.03)
S (-1) x FD x ED 0.0223** 0.0145 0.0242* 0.0245 0.0288* 0.0242
(2.18) (1.55) (1.95) (1.55) (1.89) (1.25)
Observations 43293 18758 24535 44856 18900 25956
R-squared 0.0329 0.0603 0.0284 0.0438 0.1818 0.0280
Panel B
Labor Productivity Real Wage Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full OECD Non-OECD Full OECD Non-OECD
Share (-1) -0.3923*** -0.3098*** -0.4647*** -0.0981*** -0.0878*** -0.1072***
(-5.19) (-4.59) (-4.47) (-8.77) (-7.40) (-7.55)
FD x ED 0.0196** -0.0154* 0.0296*** 0.0015 -0.0168** 0.0057
(2.38) (-1.68) (2.97) (0.21) (-2.09) (0.61)
S (-1) -0.0246*** -0.0296*** -0.0220 -0.0291*** -0.0294*** -0.0322**
(-2.69) (-6.47) (-1.29) (-3.36) (-3.71) (-2.02)
S (-1) x FD x ED 0.0059 0.0145 0.0040 0.0062 0.0030 0.0071
(0.62) (0.90) (0.38) (1.18) (0.63) (1.15)
Observations 42033 18199 23834 43293 18758 24535
R-squared 0.0839 0.3056 0.0650 0.0412 0.1809 0.0241
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3. Investor sentiment and real wages growth
Panel regression of real wages growth on lagged US investor sentiment (S), defined as Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) index orthogonalized
to US business cycle indicators. The dataset includes three-digit industries for 113 countries for the period 1970-2003 from the Unido
Indstat-3 (United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Industrial Statistics) 2006 database. The sample is broken down into
four subsamples: Nordic countries (column 1), i.e. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden; non-Nordic countries (column 2);
top economies (column 3), defined as the set of countries characterized by the top 5% ratio of stock market capitalization over GDP;
and other economies (column 4), defined as the set of countries that exhibit a ratio of stock market capitalization over GDP that does
not fall into the top 5%. The controls are: country-year and sector fixed effects; financial development (FD), defined as stock market
capitalization over GDP (1980-95 average); external dependence (ED), defined as in Rajan and Zingales (1998) as the reliance on external
finance of US listed firms in the Compustat database; the interaction between the two (FD x ED); the industry’s share of the dependent
variable in the manufacturing sector in the previous year. Standard errors are clustered by country.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nordic Non-Nordic Top Other
countries countries economies economies
Share (-1) -0.1116*** -0.1009*** -0.0743*** -0.1003***
(-22.47) (-8.45) (-7.56) (-8.44)
FD x ED -0.0309 0.0027 0.0250 -0.0004
(-1.60) (0.36) (0.77) (-0.03)
S (-1) 0.0107*** -0.0302*** 0.1307*** -0.0301***
(2.87) (-3.38) (17.27) (-3.64)
S (-1) x FD x ED -0.0073 0.0066 0.0817** 0.0179*
(-0.66) (1.26) (2.54) (1.69)
Observations 3850 38183 2461 39572
R-squared 0.5284 0.0754 0.2523 0.0848
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4. Growth and US foreign direct investments
Panel regression of employment growth (column 1), real value added growth (column 2), labor productivity (column 3), and real wages
growth (column 4) on lagged US investor sentiment, defined as Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) index orthogonalized to US business cycle
indicators and normalized to have zero mean and unit variance; an interaction term between US investor sentiment and US foreign direct
investments (US FDI), defined as the US direct investment position abroad on a historical-cost basis, expressed in USD billions, from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis; an interaction term between US investor sentiment and a country’s net foreign direct investments
(net FDI), defined as the difference between FDI made abroad by a given country and FDI received from foreign countries, expressed in
USD billions, from the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments database, supplemented by data from the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development and official national sources; an interaction term between US FDI and net FDI; an interaction
term between US FDI and financial development (FD), defined as stock market capitalization over GDP (1980-95 average); an interaction
term between US FDI and external dependence (ED), defined as in Rajan and Zingales (1998) as the reliance on external finance of US
listed firms in the Compustat database. The set of controls includes: country-year and sector fixed effects; US foreign direct investments;
a country’s net foreign direct investments; a country’s financial development; an industry’s external dependence; an interaction term
between financial development and external dependence; the industry’s share of the dependent variable in the manufacturing sector in
the previous year. Standard errors are clustered by country. The dataset includes three-digit industries for 113 countries for the period
1970-2003 from the Unido Indstat-3 (United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Industrial Statistics) 2006 database. The
dataset for US foreign direct investments however is only available as of 1983.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment Value Added Labor Real Wages
Growth Growth Productivity Growth
US Sentiment (-1) 0.0053 -0.0172 -0.0320* -0.0371
(0.35) (-0.79) (-1.72) (-1.54)
US Sentiment (-1) 0.0006*** 0.0001 -0.0005* -0.0003
x US FDI (-1) (3.47) (0.16) (-1.67) (-1.18)
US Sentiment (-1) -5.03e-13*** -1.07e-13 5.19e-13 1.59e-13
x Net FDI (-1) (-2.94) (-0.30) (1.19) (0.34)
US FDI (-1) -1.12e-14*** 9.44e-15 2.28e-14** 2.13e-14**
x Net FDI (-1) (-2.58) (1.08) (2.47) (2.04)
US FDI (-1) 0.0003 -0.0015 -0.0021 -0.0018
x FD (0.34) (-1.28) (-1.35) (-1.06)
US FDI (-1) 0.0003*** 0.0003* -0.0000 -0.0000
x ED (3.44) (1.75) (-0.16) (-0.41)
Observations 22165 22614 22165 21719
R-squared 0.0324 0.0488 0.0412 0.0958
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 5. Growth and US foreign direct investments in labor
Panel regression of employment growth (column 1), real value added growth (column 2), labor productivity (column 3), and real wages
growth (column 4) on lagged US investor sentiment, defined as Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) index orthogonalized to US business cycle
indicators; an interaction term between US investor sentiment and US foreign direct investments in labor (US FDIL), defined as the
direct investment in employment at majority-owned nonbank foreign affiliates, expressed in millions of employees, from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis; an interaction term between US investor sentiment and a country’s net foreign direct investments (net FDI), defined
as the difference between FDI made abroad by a given country and FDI received from foreign countries, expressed in USD billions, from
the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments database, supplemented by data from the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development and official national sources; an interaction term between US FDIL and net FDI; an interaction term between US
FDIL and financial development (FD), defined as stock market capitalization over GDP (1980-95 average); an interaction term between
US FDIL and external dependence (ED), defined as in Rajan and Zingales (1998) as the reliance on external finance of US listed firms
in the Compustat database. The set of controls includes: country-year and sector fixed effects; US foreign direct investments in labor;
a country’s net foreign direct investments; a country’s financial development; an industry’s external dependence; an interaction term
between financial development and external dependence; the industry’s share of the dependent variable in the manufacturing sector in
the previous year. Standard errors are clustered by country. The dataset includes three-digit industries for 113 countries for the period
1970-2003 from the Unido Indstat-3 (United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Industrial Statistics) 2006 database. The
dataset for US foreign direct investments in labor however is only available as of 1998.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment Value Added Labor Real Wages
Growth Growth Productivity Growth
US Sentiment (-1) 0.0045 -0.0162 -0.0349 -0.0571*
(0.22) (-0.64) (-1.51) (-1.65)
US Sentiment (-1) 0.0601** -0.0812 -0.1310** -0.0915*
x US FDIL (-1) (1.99) (-1.18) (-2.03) (-1.66)
US Sentiment (-1) 8.08e-14 4.57e-13 7.46e-13 7.74e-13
x Net FDI (-1) (0.44) (0.66) (1.06) (1.27)
US FDIL (-1) -1.11e-12 2.38e-12 3.24e-12 2.59e-12
x Net FDI (-1) (-1.61) (0.90) (1.42) (1.07)
US FDIL (-1) -0.0744 0.0221 -0.0507 -1.1130**
x FD (-0.40) (0.03) (-0.07) (-2.01)
US FDIL (-1) 0.0272 0.0569 0.0055 0.0065
x ED (1.34) (1.33) (0.16) (0.31)
Observations 4212 4282 4212 4130
R-squared 0.0729 0.0637 0.0616 0.157
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 6. Growth and US portfolio investments
Panel regression of employment growth (column 1), real value added growth (column 2), labor productivity (column 3), and real wages
growth (column 4) on lagged US investor sentiment, defined as Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) index orthogonalized to US business cycle
indicators and normalized to have zero mean and unit variance; an interaction term between US investor sentiment and US portfolio
investments (US PI), expressed in USD billions, from from the International Monetary Fund’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey;
an interaction term between US investor sentiment and a country’s net foreign direct investments (net FDI), defined as the difference
between FDI made abroad by a given country and FDI received from foreign countries, expressed in USD billions, from the International
Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments database, supplemented by data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
and official national sources; an interaction term between US PI and net FDI; an interaction term between US PI and financial development
(FD), defined as stock market capitalization over GDP (1980-95 average); an interaction term between US PI and external dependence
(ED), defined as in Rajan and Zingales (1998) as the reliance on external finance of US listed firms in the Compustat database. The set of
controls includes: country-year and sector fixed effects; US portfolio investments; a country’s net foreign direct investments; a country’s
financial development; an industry’s external dependence; an interaction term between financial development and external dependence;
the industry’s share of the dependent variable in the manufacturing sector in the previous year. Standard errors are clustered by country.
The dataset includes three-digit industries for 113 countries for the period 1970-2003 from the Unido Indstat-3 (United Nations Industrial
Development Organization, Industrial Statistics) 2006 database. The dataset for US portfolio investments however is only available as of
1997.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment Value Added Labor Real Wages
Growth Growth Productivity Growth
US Sentiment (-1) 0.0347 -0.0330 -0.0909** -0.0733
(0.87) (-1.03) (-2.33) (-1.50)
US Sentiment (-1) -0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0002
x US PI (-1) (-0.41) (0.08) (0.44) (-0.29)
US Sentiment (-1) -7.77e-13 -3.11e-12 -2.57e-12 -1.54e-12
x Net FDI (-1) (-0.64) (-1.39) (-1.13) (-0.80)
US PI (-1) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
x Net FDI (-1) (1.33) (0.43) (0.34) (0.78)
US PI (-1) -0.0031 -0.0057 -0.0046 -0.0102
x FD (-0.93) (-0.61) (-0.67) (-1.29)
US PI (-1) 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
x ED (0.40) (0.66) (0.43) (0.63)
Observations 1923 2005 1923 1916
R-squared 0.1050 0.1270 0.1350 0.3130
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7. Employment growth, US foreign direct investments and country popularity
Panel regression of employment growth on lagged US investor sentiment, defined as Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) index orthogonalized to
US business cycle indicators and normalized to have zero mean and unit variance; an interaction term between US investor sentiment
and US foreign direct investments (US FDI), defined as the US direct investment position abroad on a historical-cost basis, expressed
in USD billions, from the Bureau of Economic Analysis; an interaction term between US investor sentiment and a country’s net foreign
direct investments (net FDI), defined as the difference between FDI made abroad by a given country and FDI received from foreign
countries, expressed in USD billions, from the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments database, supplemented by data
from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and official national sources; an interaction term between US FDI
and net FDI; an interaction term between US FDI and financial development (FD), defined as stock market capitalization over GDP
(1980-95 average); an interaction term between US FDI and external dependence (ED), defined as in Rajan and Zingales (1998) as the
reliance on external finance of US listed firms in the Compustat database. The set of controls includes: country-year and sector fixed
effects; US foreign direct investments; a country’s net foreign direct investments; a country’s financial development; an industry’s external
dependence; an interaction term between financial development and external dependence; the industry’s share of the dependent variable
in the manufacturing sector in the previous year. Standard errors are clustered by country. The sample is split along three dimensions
of country popularity from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998): a country’s institutional framework (columns 1 and
2), defined as a dummy that takes on value one if the country has British legal origin; quality of institutions (columns 3 and 4), defined
as the International Country Risk guide’s assessment of the corruption in a country’s government; and democratic score (columns 5 and
6), defined as the Data Sharing for Demographic Research Polity III index. The dataset includes three-digit industries for 113 countries
for the period 1970-2003 from the Unido Indstat-3 (United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Industrial Statistics) 2006
database. The dataset for US foreign direct investments however is only available as of 1983.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
British Non-British High Low High Low
legal origin legal origin Quality Quality Dem. Score Dem. Score
US Sentiment (-1) 0.0149 -0.0029 0.0173* -0.0204 0.0131 -0.0174
(0.45) (-0.13) (1.74) (-0.40) (1.40) (-0.23)
US Sentiment (-1) 0.0007*** -0.0006 0.0004*** -0.0005 0.0003** -0.0008
x US FDI (-1) (3.91) (-1.37) (3.57) (-0.21) (2.04) (-0.44)
US Sentiment (-1) -6.26e-13 3.53e-13 -3.88e-13** 9.66e-12* -2.07e-13 5.33e-12
x Net FDI (-1) (-1.42) (0.97) (-2.44) (1.67) (-1.21) (1.03)
US FDI (-1) -1.15e-14*** -5.29e-14*** -7.37e-15** 1.21e-13 -3.79e-15 1.25e-13
x Net FDI (-1) (-3.23) (-3.62) (-1.98) (0.76) (-0.95) (0.60)
US FDI (-1) 0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0005 -0.0114 -0.0014 -0.0001
x FD (1.34) (-1.32) (-0.56) (-0.77) (-1.53) (-0.05)
US FDI (-1) 0.0003*** 0.0006 0.0001* 0.0045 0.0002*** 0.0026
x ED (2.92) (1.31) (1.69) (1.56) (3.00) (1.05)
Observations 8057 14108 12205 9960 14677 7488
R-squared 0.0384 0.0350 0.0499 0.0381 0.0379 0.0415
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 8. Employment growth, US foreign direct investments in labor and country popularity
Panel regression of employment growth (column 1), real value added growth (column 2), labor productivity (column 3), and real wages
growth (column 4) on lagged US investor sentiment, defined as Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) index orthogonalized to US business cycle
indicators; an interaction term between US investor sentiment and US foreign direct investments in labor (US FDIL), defined as the
direct investment in employment at majority-owned nonbank foreign affiliates, expressed in millions of employees, from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis; an interaction term between US investor sentiment and a country’s net foreign direct investments (net FDI), defined
as the difference between FDI made abroad by a given country and FDI received from foreign countries, expressed in USD billions, from
the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments database, supplemented by data from the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development and official national sources; an interaction term between US FDIL and net FDI; an interaction term between US
FDIL and financial development (FD), defined as stock market capitalization over GDP (1980-95 average); an interaction term between
US FDIL and external dependence (ED), defined as in Rajan and Zingales (1998) as the reliance on external finance of US listed firms
in the Compustat database. The set of controls includes: country-year and sector fixed effects; US foreign direct investments in labor;
a country’s net foreign direct investments; a country’s financial development; an industry’s external dependence; an interaction term
between financial development and external dependence; the industry’s share of the dependent variable in the manufacturing sector in
the previous year. Standard errors are clustered by country. The sample is split along three dimensions of country popularity from La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998): a country’s institutional framework (columns 1 and 2), defined as a dummy that
takes on value one if the country has British legal origin; quality of institutions (columns 3 and 4), defined as the International Country
Risk guide’s assessment of the corruption in a country’s government; and democratic score (columns 5 and 6), defined as the Data Sharing
for Demographic Research Polity III index. The dataset includes three-digit industries for 113 countries for the period 1970-2003 from the
Unido Indstat-3 (United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Industrial Statistics) 2006 database. The dataset for US foreign
direct investments in labor however is only available as of 1998.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
British Non-British High Low High Low
legal origin legal origin Quality Quality Dem. Score Dem. Score
US Sentiment (-1) 0.0570** -0.0102 0.0072 -0.0083 0.0157 -0.0209
(1.99) (-0.37) (0.48) (-0.13) (1.16) (-0.30)
US Sentiment (-1) 0.0854*** -0.0856 0.0607** 0.3110 0.0710* -0.0618
x US FDIL (-1) (2.65) (-0.84) (2.02) (0.97) (1.88) (-0.12)
US Sentiment (-1) 3.92e-13 1.23e-12 1.66e-14 -2.06e-12 -7.09e-14 -4.18e-12
x Net FDI (-1) (0.61) (1.43) (0.09) (-0.50) (-0.36) (-0.83)
US FDIL (-1) -3.74e-12 -3.43e-12* -1.29e-12** -2.60e-10 -1.09e-12 2.17e-10
x Net FDI (-1) (-1.09) (-1.69) (-2.14) (-1.36) (-1.60) (0.83)
US FDIL (-1) 0.5090 -0.116 -0.0047 150.7000 -0.0588 -0.1370
x FD (0.91) (-0.08) (-0.01) (1.58) (-0.15) (-0.04)
US FDIL (-1) 0.0309 0.0097 0.0083 0.0120 0.0161 0.0214
x ED (1.56) (0.26) (0.40) (0.24) (0.80) (0.30)
Observations 1423 2789 2481 1731 2990 1222
R-squared 0.1130 0.0713 0.1410 0.0751 0.1010 0.0729
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 9. Investor sentiment and growth during crises
Panel regression of employment growth (column 1), real value added growth (column 2), labor productivity (column 3), and real wages
growth (column 4) on lagged US investor sentiment, defined as Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) index orthogonalized to US business cycle
indicators and normalized to have zero mean and unit variance; an interaction term between US investor sentiment and US foreign direct
investments (US FDI), defined as the US direct investment position abroad on a historical-cost basis, expressed in USD billions, from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis; an interaction term between US investor sentiment and a country’s net foreign direct investments
(net FDI), defined as the difference between FDI made abroad by a given country and FDI received from foreign countries, expressed in
USD billions, from the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments database, supplemented by data from the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development and official national sources; an interaction term between US FDI and financial development (FD),
defined as stock market capitalization over GDP (1980-95 average); an interaction term between US FDI and external dependence (ED),
defined as in Rajan and Zingales (1998) as the reliance on external finance of US listed firms in the Compustat database; an interaction
term between US investor sentiment, US foreign direct investments and a crisis dummy, defined as the list of country-level banking
crises from Laeven and Valencia (2010); interaction term between financial development, external dependence and a crisis dummy; an
interaction term between external dependence and the crisis dummy. The set of controls includes: country-year and sector fixed effects;
US foreign direct investments; a country’s net foreign direct investments; a country’s financial development; an industry’s external
dependence; an interaction term between financial development and external dependence; the industry’s share of the dependent variable
in the manufacturing sector in the previous year. Standard errors are clustered by country. The dataset includes three-digit industries
for 113 countries for the period 1970-2003 from the Unido Indstat-3 (United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Industrial
Statistics) 2006 database. The dataset for US foreign direct investments however is only available as of 1983.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment Value Added Labor Real Wages
Growth Growth Productivity Growth
US Sentiment (-1) 0.0038 -0.0687*** -0.0333* -0.0396
(0.25) (-3.52) (-1.77) (-1.61)
US Sentiment (-1) 0.0006*** 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0003
x US FDI (-1) (4.28) (0.82) (-1.34) (-0.92)
US Sentiment (-1) -5.61e-13*** -2.80e-13 4.27e-13 1.11e-13
x Net FDI (-1) (-3.36) (-0.71) (0.93) (0.22)
US Sentiment (-1) -0.0008*** -0.0018*** -0.0010* -0.0010**
x US FDI (-1) x Crisis (-2.82) (-2.87) (-1.72) (-2.46)
FD x ED x Crisis -0.0202 -0.1070 -0.0807 -0.0299
(-0.50) (-0.88) (-0.87) (-0.97)
ED x Crisis 0.0104 0.0443 0.0310 0.0157
(0.47) (0.73) (0.68) (1.28)
US FDI (-1) -1.29e-14*** 5.45e-15 2.03e-14** 1.91e-14*
x Net FDI (-1) (-3.11) (0.72) (2.16) (1.87)
US FDI (-1) 0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0018 -0.0017
x FD (0.62) (-1.10) (-1.06) (-0.97)
US FDI (-1) 0.0003*** 0.0001 -0.0001** -0.0001
x ED (3.44) (1.39) (-2.00) (-0.69)
Observations 22165 22312 22165 21719
R-squared 0.0325 0.0450 0.0379 0.0742
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 10. Employment growth, US foreign direct investments and country popularity during crises
Panel regression of employment growth (column 1), real value added growth (column 2), labor productivity (column 3), and real wages
growth (column 4) on lagged US investor sentiment, defined as Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) index orthogonalized to US business cycle
indicators and normalized to have zero mean and unit variance; an interaction term between US investor sentiment and US foreign direct
investments (US FDI), defined as the US direct investment position abroad on a historical-cost basis, expressed in USD billions, from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis; an interaction term between US investor sentiment and a country’s net foreign direct investments
(net FDI), defined as the difference between FDI made abroad by a given country and FDI received from foreign countries, expressed in
USD billions, from the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments database, supplemented by data from the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development and official national sources; an interaction term between US FDI and financial development (FD),
defined as stock market capitalization over GDP (1980-95 average); an interaction term between US FDI and external dependence (ED),
defined as in Rajan and Zingales (1998) as the reliance on external finance of US listed firms in the Compustat database; an interaction
term between US investor sentiment, US foreign direct investments and a crisis dummy, defined as the list of country-level banking
crises from Laeven and Valencia (2010); interaction term between financial development, external dependence and a crisis dummy; an
interaction term between external dependence and the crisis dummy. The set of controls includes: country-year and sector fixed effects;
US foreign direct investments; a country’s net foreign direct investments; a country’s financial development; an industry’s external
dependence; an interaction term between financial development and external dependence; the industry’s share of the dependent variable
in the manufacturing sector in the previous year. Standard errors are clustered by country. The sample is split along three dimensions
of country popularity from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998): a country’s institutional framework (columns 1 and
2), defined as a dummy that takes on value one if the country has British legal origin; quality of institutions (columns 3 and 4), defined
as the International Country Risk guide’s assessment of the corruption in a country’s government; and democratic score (columns 5 and
6), defined as the Data Sharing for Demographic Research Polity III index. The dataset includes three-digit industries for 113 countries
for the period 1970-2003 from the Unido Indstat-3 (United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Industrial Statistics) 2006
database. The dataset for US foreign direct investments however is only available as of 1983.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
British Non-British High Low High Low
legal origin legal origin Quality Quality Dem. Score Dem. Score
US Sentiment (-1) 0.0149 -0.0031 0.0159 -0.0194 0.0118 -0.0105
(0.46) (-0.13) (1.59) (-0.39) (1.24) (-0.13)
US Sentiment (-1) 0.0007*** -0.0006 0.0005*** -0.0018 0.0004*** -0.0017
x US FDI (-1) (3.75) (-0.98) (4.79) (-0.49) (2.72) (-0.57)
US Sentiment (-1) -5.97e-13 3.57e-13 -4.40e-13*** 1.14e-11* -2.57e-13 6.83e-12
x Net FDI (-1) (-1.32) (0.76) (-2.69) (1.75) (-1.53) (0.98)
US Sentiment (-1) -0.0276** -0.0000 -0.0006*** 0.0031 -0.0005** 0.0028
x US FDI (-1) x Crisis (-2.02) (-0.00) (-2.77) (0.65) (-1.96) (0.46)
FD x ED x Crisis -0.0252 -0.0310 0.0026 -0.1130 0.0012 -0.1290
(-0.35) (-0.74) (0.15) (-0.82) (0.05) (-0.79)
ED x Crisis 0.0201 0.0066 -0.0070 0.0288 -0.0067 0.0362
(0.31) (0.35) (-0.57) (0.80) (-0.51) (0.68)
US FDI (-1) -1.17e-14*** -5.29e-14*** -8.77e-15** 1.55e-13 -5.30e-15 1.47e-13
x Net FDI (-1) (-3.20) (-3.40) (-2.57) (0.84) (-1.53) (0.68)
US FDI (-1) 0.0008 -0.0018 -0.0003 -0.0109 -0.0012 -0.0005
x FD (1.45) (-1.01) (-0.42) (-0.67) (-1.36) (-0.27)
US FDI (-1) 0.0003*** 0.0007 0.0001 0.0044 0.0002*** 0.0024
x ED (2.87) (1.38) (1.62) (1.45) (2.87) (0.95)
Observations 8057 14108 12205 9960 14677 7488
R-squared 0.0385 0.0350 0.0504 0.0380 0.0381 0.0412
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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